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Abstract—IoT devices are increasingly being implicated in
cyber-attacks, driving community concern about the risks they
pose to critical infrastructure, corporations, and citizens. In order
to reduce this risk, the IETF is pushing IoT vendors to develop
formal specifications of the intended purpose of their IoT devices,
in the form of a Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD), so
that their network behavior in any operating environment can
be locked down and verified rigorously.
This paper aims to assist IoT manufacturers in developing
and verifying MUD profiles, while also helping adopters of these
devices to ensure they are compatible with their organizational
policies. Our first contribution is to develop a tool that takes the
traffic trace of an arbitrary IoT device as input and automatically
generates a MUD profile for it. We contribute our tool as open
source, apply it to 28 consumer IoT devices, and highlight
insights and challenges encountered in the process. Our second
contribution is to apply a formal semantic framework that
not only validates a given MUD profile for consistency, but
also checks its compatibility with a given organizational policy.
Finally, we apply our framework to representative organizations
and selected devices, to demonstrate how MUD can reduce the
effort needed for IoT acceptance testing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many online IoT devices can be found on search engines
such as Shodan [13], and if they have any vulnerability,
it can then be exploited at scale, for example, to launch
DDoS attacks. For instance, Dyn, a major DNS, was attacked
by means of a DDoS attack originated from a large IoT
botnet composed of thousands of compromised IP-cameras
[9]. IoT devices, exposing TCP/UDP ports to arbitrary remote
endpoints, are used by attackers to reflect/amplify attacks or
to infiltrate otherwise secure networks.
This has prompted standards bodies to provide guidelines
for the Internet community to build secure IoT devices and
services [15]–[17]. In addition, the US Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) has stated the need for additional
regulation of IoT systems [6]. There is also a practical proposal
called Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) which is being
reviewed by the IETF. This proposal requires manufacturers
of IoTs to publish a behavioral profile of their device. Manu-
facturers have the most insight into what resources the devices
will need once they are installed in a network; for example,
an IP camera should only use DNS and DHCP on the local
network, and communicate to NTP server and its own cloud-
based controller, but nothing else. These requirements vary
across IoTs from different manufacturers. Knowing each one’s
requirements would allow a tight set of Access Control Lists
(ACLs) to be imposed.
Manufacturers should be best-suited to author the network
profiles which will be required by their devices. Therefore,
the IETF MUD proposal provides a light-weight model of
achieving very effective baseline security for IoT devices
by simply allowing a network to automatically configure
the required network access for IoT devices so that they
can perform their intended functions without granting them
unrestricted network privileges. However, what do we do if
a manufacturer incorrectly specifies its MUD or the MUD
profile conflicts with the security policy of our network?
The MUD approach differs from existing cyber-security ap-
proaches because it is an open and standards-based approach,
uses the subject matter expertise of device manufacturers,
and importantly is scalable to minimize the effort of securing
IoT endpoints. But, manufacturers need help to generate and
verify their MUD profiles, and network operators to verify
the compatibility of MUD profiles with their organizational
policies.
MUD is a new and emerging paradigm, and there is little
collective wisdom today on how manufacturers should develop
behavioral profiles of their IoT devices, or how organizations
should use these profiles to secure their network. This paper
is our attempt to address both these shortcomings.
Our specific contributions are as follows: We first develop
a tool that takes the packet trace of an IoT device as input and
automatically generates a MUD profile for it. We contribute
our tool as open source, apply it to 28 consumer IoT devices,
and highlight insights and challenges encountered in the pro-
cess. We then apply a formal semantic framework that not only
validates a given MUD profile for consistency, but also checks
its compatibility with a given organizational policy. Finally,
we apply our framework to representative organizations and
selected devices, to demonstrate how MUD can reduce the
effort needed for IoT acceptance testing.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Security of IoT devices has not kept up with the rapid
pace of innovation, creating substantial safety and economic
risks for the Internet [14]. Today, many IoT products do
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Fig. 1: A metagraph consisting of six variables, five sets and
three edges.
not incorporate even basic security measures [12]. As IoT
botnets grow and become mature, attackers are using them
to launch more advanced DDoS attacks [3]; devices such as
baby monitors, refrigerators and smart plugs have been hacked
and controlled remotely [26]; there are many cameras that can
be accessed publicly [1], [31] since network operators often do
not impose access control policies to these IoT devices [28].
While it may seem impossible to identify all potential forms
of adversary or to stop all anticipated threats, we should at
least be able to enhance the penetration resistance of IoTs and
make them less vulnerable [16]. It has been shown that IoTs
often employ a limited set of flow rules to few remote/Internet-
based endpoints in a recognizable pattern [25]. So it should
be possible to discover and prevent unintended activity at the
network level. But, only if we knew what behavior is intended.
The Internet draft for MUD specification [11] promotes
the device manufacturer to clearly define the communication
pattern of a device in the form of access control rules. This
allows network monitoring tools to secure the device based
on the principle that if an observed behavior of the device
is not in the profile, then that communication is considered
a threat. By translating access control rules to network rules
we can restrict local/remote communication to restricted flows
and endpoints. This helps safeguard the device.
An operational critical infrastructure or enterprise network,
should have a local security policy. The IETF MUD specifica-
tion proposes plug and play of IoT devices in a network, but
this convenience brings with it serious security implications.
For instance, a MUD controller’s attempt to dynamically
enable a MUD policy in a network for a freshly connected
IoT device can result in the breach of security policy or best
practices. In this paper we propose an extension that can be
used along with the MUD controller to check compliance of
a MUD profile with an organizational policy. We show how
such checks can be automated and constructed using rigorous
formal semantics, before devices are powered or deployed.
Lack of formal policy modeling capabilities in current
network configuration systems contribute to the frequent mis-
configurations found [22], [23], [30].
A metagraph is a generalized graph theoretic structure that
offers rigorous formal foundations for modeling and analyzing
communication-network policies in general. We use them here
to model and analyze MUD policies. A metagraph is a directed
graph between a collection of sets of ‘atomic’ elements [2].
Each set is a node in the graph and each directed edge
represents the relationship between the sets. Figure 1 shows
TABLE I: Flows observed for Blipcare BP monitor (*:
wildcard, proto: Protocol, sPort: source port number, dPort:
destination port number).
Source Destination proto sPort dPort
* 192.168.1.1 17 * 53
192.168.1.1 * 17 53 *
* tech.carematix.com 6 * 8777
tech.carematix.com * 6 8777 *
an example where a set of users (U1) are related to sets of
network resources (R1, R2, R3) by the edges e1, e2 and e3
describing which user ui is allowed to access resource rj .
Metagraphs can also have attributes associated with their
edges. An example is a conditional metagraph which includes
propositions – statements that may be true or false – assigned
to their edges as qualitative attributes [2]. The generating sets
of these metagraphs are partitioned into a variable set and a
proposition set. A conditional metagraph is formally defined
as follows:
Definition 1 (Conditional Metagraph). A conditional meta-
graph is a metagraph S=〈Xp ∪Xv, E〉 in which Xp is a set
of propositions and Xv is a set of variables, and:
1. at least one vertex is not null, i.e., ∀e′ ∈ E, Ve′∪We′ 6= φ
2. the invertex and outvertex of each edge must be disjoint,
i.e., X = Xv ∪Xp with Xv ∩Xp = φ
3. an outvertex containing propositions cannot contain other
elements, i.e., ∀p ∈ Xp,∀e′ ∈ E, if p ∈We′ , then We′ = p.
Conditional metagraphs enable the specification of stateful
network-policies and have several useful operators. These
operators readily allow one to analyze MUD policy properties
like consistency. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt for automatic generation of MUD profile and
also formally check for consistency and its compatibility with
an organizational policy prior to installing the access control
rules.
III. MUD PROFILE GENERATION
The IETF MUD specification is still evolving as a draft.
Hence, IoT device manufacturers have not yet provided MUD
profiles for their devices. We, therefore, developed a tool –
MUDgee – which automatically generates a MUD profile for
an IoT device from its traffic trace in order to make this process
faster, cheaper and more accurate. In this section, we describe
the structure of our open source tool [8], apply it to traces of
28 consumer IoT devices, and highlight insights.
We captured traffic flows for each IoT device during a six
month observation period, to generate our MUD rules. The
rules reflect an application whitelisting model (i.e., there are
no explicit ‘drop’ rules). Having a combination of ‘accept’
and ‘drop’ rules requires a notion of rule priority (i.e., order)
and is not supported by the current IETF MUD draft. For
example, Table I shows traffic flows observed in our lab for
a Blipcare blood pressure monitor. The device only generates
traffic whenever it is used. It first resolves its intended server at
tech.carematrix.com by exchanging a DNS query/re-
sponse with the default gateway (i.e., the top two flows). It
then uploads the measurement to its server operating on TCP
port 8777 (described by the bottom two rules).
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Fig. 2: Algorithm for capturing device flows and inserting reactive rules.
TABLE II: Proactive flow rules for an IoT device.
id sEth dEth typeEth Source Destination proto sPort dPort priority action
a <gwMAC> <devMAC> 0x0800 * * 1 * * 100 forward
b.1 <devMAC> <gwMAC> 0x0800 * * 1 * * 100 mirror
b.2 <devMAC> <gwMAC> 0x86dd * * 58 * * 100 mirror
c <gwMAC> <devMAC> 0x0800 * * 17 123 * 100 forward
d.1 <gwMAC> <devMAC> * * * 17 53 * 100 mirror
d.2 <devMAC> <gwMAC> * * * 17 * 53 100 mirror
e.1 * <devMAC> 0x0806 * * * * * 100 forward
e.2 <devMAC> * 0x0806 * * * * * 100 forward
f <gwMAC> <devMAC> * gw local IP * * * * 90 forward
g <devMAC> <gwMAC> * * gw local IP * * * 90 forward
h <devMAC> * 0x888e * * * * * 3 forward
i <devMAC> * * * * * * * 2 mirror
j * <devMAC> * * * * * * 2 mirror
A. MUDgee Architecture
MUDgee implements a programmable virtual switch
(vSwitch) with a header inspection engine attached and plays
an input PCAP trace (of an arbitrary IoT device) into the
switch. MUDgee has two separate modules; (a) captures and
tracks all TCP/UDP flows to/from device, and (b) composes
a MUD profile from the flow rules.
Capture intended flows: Consumer IoT devices use services
provided by remote servers on the cloud and also expose ser-
vices to local hosts (e.g., a mobile App). We track (intended)
device activities for both remote and local communications
using separate flow rules.
It is challenging to capture services (i.e., especially those
operating on non-standard TCP/UDP ports) that a device is
either accessing or exposing. This is because local/remote
services operate on static port numbers whereas source port
numbers are dynamic (and chosen randomly) for different
flows of the same service. Also, inferring the direction of UDP
flows is non trivial, though for TCP flows it can be deduced by
inspecting the SYN flag. We developed an algorithm (Fig. 2)
to capture bidirectional flows for an IoT device.
We first configure the vSwitch with a set of proactive rules,
each with a specific action (i.e., “forward” or “mirror”) and
a priority. These rules are listed in Table II. Proactive rules
with a ‘mirror’ action will feed the header inspection engine
with a copy of the matched packets. Our inspection algorithm,
shown in Fig. 2, will insert a corresponding reactive rule into
the vSwitch.
For example, a DNS reply packet is matched to a top priority
flow (i.e., flow id ‘d.1’ in Table II) and our algorithm extracts
and stores the domain name and its associated IP address into
a DNS cache table. This cache is dynamically updated upon
arrival of a DNS reply matching an existing request.
The MUD specification requires the segregation of traffic to
and from a device for both local and Internet communications.
Our algorithm achieves this by assigning a unique priority to
the reactive rules associated with each of the groups: from-
local, to-local, from-Internet and to-Internet. We use a specific
priority for flows that contain a TCP SYN to identify if the
device or the remote entity initiated the communication.
Table III shows the flow rules captured for an Awair air
quality monitor. The device uses the local gateway and the
Google DNS server (i.e., 8.8.8.8) to resolve its domain names.
It also periodically time synchronizes with pool.net.org.
The IoT device does not have any local communication and
only uses TCP for remote communication.
Flow translation to MUD: MUDgee uses the captured traffic
flows to generate the MUD profiles for the devices by consid-
ering the following:
Consideration 1: We use the DNS cache to reverse lookup
the IP address of the remote endpoint to a domain name, if
any.
Consideration 2: Some consumer IoTs, especially IP cam-
eras, typically use the STUN! (STUN!) protocol to verify
that the user’s mobile app can stream video directly from the
camera over the Internet. If a device uses the STUN protocol
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TABLE III: Awair air quality reactive flow rules
sEth dEth typeEth Source Destination proto sPort dPort priority
<devMAC> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0x0006 * * * * * 102
<devMAC> ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 0x0800 * 255.255.255.255 17 * 67 102
<devMAC> <gwMAC> 0x0800 * 8.8.8.8 17 * 53 101
<devMAC> <gwMAC> 0x0800 * 192.168.1.1 17 * 53 101
<devMAC> <gwMAC> 0x0800 * pool.ntp.org 17 * 123 101
<gwMAC> <devMAC> 0x0800 8.8.8.8 * 17 53 * 101
<gwMAC> <devMAC> 0x0800 192.168.1.1 * 17 53 * 101
<gwMAC> <devMAC> 0x0800 pool.ntp.org * 17 123 * 101
<devMAC> <gwMAC> 0x0800 * ota.awair.is 6 * 443 32
<devMAC> <gwMAC> 0x0800 * timeserver.awair.is 6 * 443 32
<devMAC> <gwMAC> 0x0800 * api.awair.is 6 * 443 32
<devMAC> <gwMAC> 0x0800 * messaging.awair.is 6 * 8883 32
<gwMAC> <devMAC> 0x0800 ota.awair.is * 6 443 * 21
<gwMAC> <devMAC> 0x0800 timeserver.awair.is * 6 443 * 21
<gwMAC> <devMAC> 0x0800 api.awair.is * 6 443 * 21
<gwMAC> <devMAC> 0x0800 messaging.awair.is * 6 8883 * 21
over UDP, we must allow all UDP traffic to/from Internet
servers because the STUN servers often require the client
device to connect to different IP addresses or port numbers.
Consideration 3: We observed that several smart IP cameras
communicate with many remote servers operating on the
same port (e.g., August doorbell camera). However, no DNS
responses were found corresponding to the server IP addresses.
So, the device must obtain the IP address of its servers via a
non-standard channel (e.g., the current server may instruct the
device with the IP address of the subsequent server). For this
case, we allow remote traffic to/from any IP addresses (i.e.,
*), but use a specific port number.
Consideration 4: Some devices (e.g., TPLink plug) use the
default gateway as the DNS resolver, and others (e.g., Belkin
WeMo motion) continuously ping the default gateway. The
existing MUD draft maps local communication to fixed IP
addresses through the controller construct. We consider the
local gateway to act as the controller, and use the name-space
urn:ietf:params:mud: gateway for the gateway.
The generated MUD profiles of the 28 consumer IoT devices
we analyzed are listed in Table IV and are publicly available
at: http://149.171.189.1/mud/.
B. Insights and challenges
The Sankey diagrams [24] in Figure 3 represent the MUD
profiles for three IoT devices, namely Blipcare BP monitor,
TP-Link camera and Amazon Echo.
The Blipcare BP monitor is an example device with static
functionalities. It exchanges DNS queries/responses with the
local gateway and communicates with a single domain name
over TCP port 8777. So its behavior can be locked down to a
limited set of static flow rules. The majority of IoT devices that
we tested (i.e., 22 out of 28) fall into this category (marked
in green in Table IV).
Fig. 3(b) exemplifies the second category of our generated
MUD profiles. The TP-Link camera accesses/exposes limited
ports on the local network. It gets its DNS queries resolved,
discovers local network using mDNS service over UDP 5353,
probes members of certain multicast groups using IGMP, and
exposes two TCP ports 80 (management console) and 8080
(unicast video streaming) to local devices. All these activities
can be defined by a tight set of ACLs. But, over the Internet,
the camera communicates to its STUN server (accessing an
TABLE IV: List of IoT devices for which we have generated
MUD profiles. Devices with purely static functionality are
marked in green. Devices with static functionality that is
loosely defined (e.g., due to use of STUN protocol) are marked
in blue. Devices with complex and dynamic functionality are
marked in red.
Type IoT device
Camera
Netatmo Welcome, Dropcam, Withings Smart
Baby Monitor, Canary camera, TP-Link Day
Night Cloud camera, August doorbell camera,
Samsung SmartCam, Ring doorbell, Belkin
NetCam
Air quality
sensors
Awair air quality monitor, Nest smoke sensor,
Netatmo weather station
Healthcare
devices
Withings Smart scale, Blipcare Blood
Pressure meter, Withings Aura smart sleep
sensor
Switches and
Triggers
iHome power plug, WeMo power switch,
TPLink plug, Wemo Motion Sensor
Lightbulbs Philips Hue lightbulb, LiFX bulb
Hub Amazon Echo, SmartThings
Multimedia Chromecast, Triby Speaker
Other HP printer, Pixstar Photoframe, Hello Barbie
arbitrary range of IP addresses and port numbers shown by
the top flow), to port numbers on specific endpoints including
time synchronization with pool.ntp.org. Such IoT devices
with static functionalities that are loosely defined, due to use of
STUN protocol fall in to this second category (marked in blue
in Table IV). This category device manufacturers can configure
their STUN servers to use a specific set of endpoints and port
numbers, instead of a wide and arbitrary range.
Amazon Echo, represents devices with complex and dy-
namic functionalities augmentable using custom recipes or
skills. Such devices (marked in red in Table IV), are able
to communicate with a growing range of endpoints on the
Internet, which the original manufacturer cannot define in
advance. For example, our Amazon Echo communicates with
meethue.com over TCP 443, to interact with the Hue
lightbulb in the test bed. It can also contact the news website
abc.net.au when prompted by the user. For these type
of devices, the biggest challenge is how manufacturers can
dynamically update their MUD profiles to match the device
capabilities.
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Fig. 3: Sankey diagram of MUD profile for: (a) Blipcare BP monitor, (b) TP-Link camera, and (c) Amazon Echo.
IV. MUD PROFILE VERIFICATION
Network operators should not automatically implement a
device’s MUD policy without first checking its validity. Lack
of rigorous policy verification in current network-configuration
systems is a key contributor to the configuration errors com-
monly found [23], [30]. We describe here in detail, the
verification steps we apply on a device MUD profile to ensure
only policies that adhere to the IETF MUD specification and
are semantically correct are deployed to a network.
A. Syntactic correctness
A MUD profile consists of a YANG model which describes
device-specific network behavior. In the initial version of
MUD, this model is serialized using JSON [11]. JSON offers
more compactness and readability, relative to XML. A MUD
profile is limited to the serialization of only a few YANG
modules (e.g., ietf-access-control-list) [11]. MUDdy will throw
an invalid syntax exception when parsing a MUD profile
if it encounters any schema beyond these permitted YANG
modules.
In addition, MUDdy also rejects MUD profiles containing
IP addresses (in particular those with local significance). As
per the IETF specification, publishers of MUD profiles are
advised to use the abstractions provided in the specification
and avoid using IP addresses. MUDdy will also reject a MUD
profile if it contains actions other than ”accept” or ”drop”.
B. Semantic correctness
Checking a MUD policy’s syntax partly verifies its correct-
ness. A syntactically correct policy must also be semantically
correct for it to be well designed. For instance, it is necessary
to check a MUD policy for inconsistencies.
Inconsistencies in a MUD policy can stem from two
sources; (a) due to overlapping rules with different access-
control actions; and/or (b) due to overlapping rules with
identical actions. In the absence of rule ordering (as in the
case of the IETF MUD specification), the former set of rules
depict ambiguous intent of the policy authors. We refer to such
rules as intent-ambiguous rules. Rule order is irrelevant for the
latter type of rules which associate a clear (single) outcome.
We refer to such rules as redundancies.
Inconsistencies in a security policy can produce unintended
consequences [29]. So, correct MUD policy deployment de-
mands the ability to check for inconsistencies accurately. We
do so by modeling MUD policies using metagraphs and then
applying the readily available metagraph algebras.
1) Policy modeling: Access-control policies are commonly
represented using the five-tuple: source/destination address,
protocol, source/destination ports [5], [10], [18]. We construct
metagraph models for the MUD policies leveraging this idea.
A representative example from our case study is shown in
Figure 4. Here, the source/destination addresses are repre-
sented by the labels device, local-network, local-gateway and
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Fig. 4: Metagraph model of a Lifx bulb’s MUD policy. The
policy describes permitted traffic flow behavior. Each edge
label depicts a set of propositions of the metagraph. For ex-
ample e4={protocol = 17, UDP.dport = 53, UDP.sport =
0− 65535, action = accept}.
a domain-name (e.g., pool.ntp.org). Protocol, ports and time
are propositions of the conditional metagraph.
2) Policy definition and verification: We wrote MGtoolkit
[20] – a package for implementing metagraphs – to define our
policy models. MGtoolkit is implemented in Python 2.7. The
API allows users to instantiate metagraphs, apply metagraph
operations and evaluate results.
Mgtoolkit provides a ConditionalMetagraph
class which extends a Metagraph and supports
proposition attributes in addition to variables. A
ConditionalMetagraph inherits the base properties and
methods of a Metagraph and additionally supports methods
to check reachability properties and consistency properties.
We use the ConditionalMetagraph class to instantiate
the MUD policy models in § IV-B1. We then invoke the API
methods to check policy properties such as consistency.
Our verification of metagraph consistency uses dominance
[2] which can be introduced constructively as follows:
Definition 2 (Edge-dominant Metapath). Given a metagraph
S=〈X,E〉 for any two sets of elements B and C in X , a
metapath M(B,C) is said to be edge-dominant if no proper
subset of M(B,C) is also a metapath from B to C.
Definition 3 (Input-dominant Metapath). Given a metagraph
S=〈X,E〉 for any two sets of elements B and C in X , a
metapath M(B,C) is said to be input-dominant if there is no
metapath M ′(B′, C) such that B′ ⊂ B.
In other words, edge-dominance (input-dominance) ensures
that none of the edges (elements) in the metapath is super-
fluous. Based on these concepts, a dominant metapath can
be defined as follows. A non-dominant metapath indicates
redundancy in the policy represented by the metagraph.
Definition 4 (Dominant Metapath). Given a metagraph
S=〈X,E〉 for any two sets of elements B and C in X , a
metapath M(B,C) is said to be dominant if it is both edge
dominant and input-dominant.
The potential ‘conflict set’ of propositions in a metapath
M(B,C) can also be defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Conflict-set of Propositions). Given a condi-
tional metagraph S=〈Xv∪Xp, E〉 for any two sets of elements
B and C in X , a metapath M(B,C) has the potential conflict
set of propositions given by (
⋃
e∈M(B,C) Ve) ∩Xp.
Once a conflict set is identified we can apply domain-
specific knowledge to determine intent-ambiguous rules in
a MUD policy. For instance, with access-control policies
such rules occur when flows overlap and associate different
response actions (e.g., accept and drop).
3) Compatibility with best practices: Policy consistency
checks partly verify if a MUD policy is semantically correct. It
may also be necessary to check MUD policy semantics against
industry recommended practices: e.g., ANSI/ISA- 62443-1-1,
for compliance. Doing so, is critical when installing an IoT
device in a SCADA network. where more restrictive practices
are required to prevent serious injury of people, or even death!
SCADA best practices offer a wide spectrum of security
policies, representative of various organizations, to compare
our MUD policies against. For instance, they include policies
for the highly protected SCADA zone (which for instance
runs a power plant) as well as the more moderately restrictive
Corporate zone.
We have investigated the problem of policy comparison
using formal semantics, in the SCADA domain for firewall
access-control policies [21]. We adapt the methods and al-
gebras developed there, to also check MUD policies against
SCADA best practices. Key steps enabling these formal com-
parisons are summarized below.
Equivalent MUD policies can be specified in many ways.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate the idea using TCP port filtering
of single packets. Each rectangle indicates the allowed packets
of a single rule. Combined the rules cover the same set of
accepted packets.
An efficient approach to comparing these policies accurately
is by deriving a unique, canonical representation of each MUD
policy. We dissect the polygon formed in our example policy
into horizontal partitions (Figure 5(c)), using a Rectilinear-
Polygon to Rectangle conversion algorithm [7]. Each partition
is chosen to provably guarantee its uniqueness. Canonical
MUD policy elements are derived by translating each partition
back to a rule and ordering the resulting rule-set uniquely
in increasing IP protocol number and source and destination
port numbers. We find a unique partition quickly rather than
a guaranteed minimal partition. The result is a deterministic,
ordered set of non-overlapping rules.
Canonicalisation of policies can be represented through a
mapping c : Φ→ Θ, where Φ is the policy space and Θ is the
canonical space of policies, in which all equivalent policies of
Φ map to a singleton. For pX , pY ∈ Φ, we note the following
(the proof follows the definition)
Lemma 6. Policies pX ≡ pY iff c(pX) = c(pY ).
So, a MUD policy compliance check can be performed by
comparing canonical policy components. For instance
Is c(pdevice→controller) = c(pSCADA→Corp) ?
Another useful notation, linked to the goal of policy com-
parison, is that policy PA includes policy PB . Particularly in
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(a) Four rules indicated by (overlapping) rectangles. (b) Five rules producing an equivalent policy to (a). (c) Horizontal partitions of polygon in (a) or (b).
Fig. 5: Canonicalisation of distinct rule sets of the same MUD policy. Rectangles indicate the packets allowed by a particular
rule.
SCADA networks, the notation helps evaluate whether a MUD
policy is compliant with industry-recommended practices in
[4], [27]. These guidelines specify potentially dangerous ser-
vices (e.g., HTTP) that should be prohibited from traversing
inbound and/or outbound from the (protected) SCADA zone.
A violation here, means installing the IoT device increases the
vulnerability of a SCADA zone to cyber attacks.
We indicate that a policy complies with another if it is more
restrictive and define the following
Definition 7 (Inclusion). A policy pX is included in pY on A
iff pX(s) ∈ {pY (s), φ}, i.e., X either has the same effect as
Y on s, or denies s, for all s ∈ A. We denote inclusion by
pX ⊂ pY .
A device MUD policy (MP ) can now be checked against
a best practice policy (RP ) for compliance using an inclusion
check
Is pMP ⊂ pRP ?
The above approach can likewise be used to check MUD
policies against an organisation’s internal security policy. By
doing so, we can ensure that IoT devices are plug and play
enabled, only in the compatible zones of a company’s network.
V. EVALUATION OF RESULTS
We ran our system on a standard desktop computer (e.g.,
Intel Core CPU 2.7-GHz computer with 8GB of RAM running
Mac OS X). It was used to generate the MUD files for 28
IoT devices in our test bed. Each MUD file policy was then
modeled using a conditional metagraph and instantiated using
MGtoolkit. A high-level summary of these MUD files and their
metagraphs are given in Table V.
As the table shows, MUD file LoC is a good indicator of
policy complexity. For instance, a Chrome cast device has
3863 LoC in its MUD file while a Lifx bulb only has 374 LoC.
The result indicates the former policy is more complex. A
metagraph helps to visualize this increase in policy complexity
more easily. The resemblance of a metagraph to a network
allows one to exploit the pattern recognition capabilities of the
human visual cortex to better visualize policies. For instance,
compare the policy metagraph of a Chrome cast device in
Figure 6 against that of the Lifx bulb in Figure 4. One can
easily understand the increase in size and complexity of the
former policy relative to the latter, by simply inspecting the
two metagraphs.
We identified inconsistencies in the MUD policies using the
metagraph algebras defined in § IV-B2. There were no intent-
ambiguous rules found since the MUD files were generated
using an application whitelisting model (i.e., restricting to
accept rules). However, redundancies are still possible and
Table V shows the redundancies found. For instance, there
were three redundant rules in the Belkin camera’s MUD policy
(Table V). These rules enabled ICMP traffic to the device
from the local network as well as the local controller, making
the policy inefficient. We determined these redundancies by
computing non-dominant metapaths in the policy metagraphs
(as per Definition 4).
Table V also shows the results of our best practice com-
pliance checks of the MUD policies. For instance, a Blipcare
blood pressure monitor can be safely installed in the Demilita-
rized zone (DMZ) or the Corporate zone in a network, but not
in the SCADA zone. Installing the device in the SCADA zone
would cause 50% of its MUD policy rules to violate the best
practices (Table V), exposing the zone to cyber attacks. The
violation is due to policy rules which enable DNS from the
device or enable the device to communicate with the Internet
directly.
In comparison, an Amazon echo speaker can only be safely
installed in the DMZ of a network. Table V shows that 29% of
the device’s MUD policy rules violate the best practices if it’s
installed in the SCADA zone. Only 2% of the rules violate if
it’s installed in the Corporate zone. The former violation stems
from policy rules which for instance, enable HTTP inbound
to the device. The latter stems from rules which enable ICMP
inbound to the device from the Internet.
MUDdy’s ability to pinpoint to MUD rules which cause best
practice violations, helps us to identify possible workarounds
to achieve compliance. For instance, with the Belkin camera,
local DNS servers and Web servers can be employed to
localize the device’s DNS and Web communications and
overcome the violations.
VI. DISCUSSION
Our use of an application whitelisting model in generating
a MUD profile, eliminates intent-ambiguous rules by design
and reduces potential inconsistencies to just redundancies.
Thus, the effort required to check MUD policy consistency
is reduced. Moreover, the use of explicit ‘drop’ rules requires
considering rule order to determine correct policy outcome.
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Fig. 6: Metagraph model of a Chrome cast device’s MUD policy. The policy describes permitted traffic behavior.
TABLE V: MUD policy analysis summary for our test bed IoT devices ( Safe to install? indicates where in a network (e.g.,
Enterprise Zone, SCADA Zone, DMZ) the device can be installed without violating best practices, LoC - Lines of Code, DMZ
- Demilitarized Zone, Corp Zone - Enterprise Zone).
Device name #MUD
profile
rules
MUD
profile
LoC
#Redundant
rules
Safe to
install ?
% Rules
violating
SCADA
Zone
% Rules
violating
Corp Zone
Blipcare blood pressure monitor 6 182 0 DMZ, Corp Zone 50 0
Netatmo weather station 6 182 0 DMZ, Corp Zone 50 0
SmartThings hub 10 298 0 DMZ, Corp Zone 60 0
Hello barbie doll 12 368 0 DMZ, Corp Zone 33 0
Withings scale 15 430 4 DMZ, Corp Zone 33 0
Lifx bulb 15 374 0 DMZ, Corp Zone 60 0
Ring door bell 16 522 0 DMZ, Corp Zone 38 0
Awair air quality monitor 16 352 0 DMZ, Corp Zone 50 0
Withings baby monitor 18 430 0 DMZ, Corp Zone 28 0
iHome power plug 17 368 0 DMZ 41 6
TPlink camera 22 528 0 DMZ 50 4
TPlink plug 25 766 0 DMZ 24 4
Canary camera 26 786 0 DMZ 27 4
Withings sleep sensor 28 730 0 DMZ 29 4
Drop camera 28 840 0 DMZ 43 11
Net smoke sensor 32 824 0 DMZ 25 3
Hue bulb 33 979 0 DMZ 27 3
Wemo motion detector 35 799 0 DMZ 54 8
Triby speaker 38 1046 0 DMZ 29 3
Netatmo camera 40 1094 1 DMZ 28 2
Belkin camera 46 1203 3 DMZ 52 11
Pixstar photo frame 46 1210 0 DMZ 48 28
August door bell camera 55 744 9 DMZ 42 13
Samsung smart camera 62 1487 0 DMZ 39 19
Amazon echo speaker 66 1800 4 DMZ 29 2
HP printer 67 1196 10 DMZ 25 9
Wemo switch 98 2523 3 DMZ 24 6
Chrome cast 150 3863 24 DMZ 11 2
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Fig. 7: Metagraph model of a Samsung smart camera’s MUD policy. The policy describes permitted traffic (black edges) and
denied traffic (red edges) behavior. Each label edge depicts a set of propositions of the metagraph. For example e4={protocol =
1, action = drop}.
The requirement increases policy specification complexity
without any real benefit.
Drop rules also make policy visualization more difficult.
Consider the metagraph in Figure 7 which describes a MUD
policy containing accept and drop rules. Each metagraph edge
describes an enabled traffic flow, when a whitelisting model is
adopted. The absence of an edge implies two metagraph nodes
don’t communicate with one another. But when drop rules
are introduced, an edge now additionally describes prohibited
traffic flows between the nodes. This hinders easy visualization
and understanding of a MUD policy.
Restricting to accept rules (with a default drop-all rule)
renders rule order irrelevant. A MUD policy holds the same
semantics, irrespective of how rules are organized, removing
dependencies from the policy specification. A policy author
can then add or remove a rule without considering the com-
plete rule set and the potential interactions. We recommend the
IETF MUD specification be revised to only support explicit
‘accept’ rules.
Our suit of tools also allow one to check a MUD policy is
compliant with an organizational policy, prior to deployment.
This ability reduces the effort required to acceptance-test an
IoT device because we need not test the device in network
segments where its MUD policy fails to comply with the
organizational policy.
The IETF MUD specification also advises publishers of
MUD profiles to use abstractions provided and avoid using IP
addresses. But upon clarification with the specification authors,
we found that the use of public IP addresses is still permitted.
This relaxation of the rule allows close coupling of policy with
network implementation, increasing its sensitivity to network
changes. A MUD policy describes IoT device behavior and
should only change when its actual behavior alters and not due
to changes to network implementation! Hardcoded public IP
addresses can also lead to DoS of target hosts. A good example
is the DoS of NTP servers at the University of Wisconsin
due to hardcoded IP addresses in Netgear routers [19]. We
recommend that support for explicit IP addresses (public or
private) be dropped from the MUD specification.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The Internet of Things interconnects billions of every day
devices to the Internet, integrating the physical and cyber
worlds. But, increased interconnectivity also increases the
exposure of these devices to unwanted intrusions. The IETF
MUD proposal aims to reduce the threat surface of an IoT
device to what is intended by the manufacturer.
In this paper, we propose a suite of tools that allow to
automatically generate and formally verify IoT device MUD
profiles, to ensure the MUD policies are consistent and com-
patible with organizational policies. We use these tools to
demonstrate how MUD can reduce the effort needed to secure
IoT devices.
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